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Pragmatism and Precision: Psychology in the service of Civil Litigation 
 
 
Whilst forensic psychology is commonly associated with the criminal and family law 
domains, its ambit to offer skills and knowledge at the legal interface also makes it 
particularly suited to the Civil law domain.  At this time, Civil law is arguably the least 
represented legislative area in terms of psychological research and professional 
commentary.  However, it is also a broad area, with its very breadth providing scope for 
research consideration, as urged by Greene (2003).  The purposes of this paper are: (1) to 
review the broad role of the psychologist in the conduct of civil litigation matters in 
Australia; (2) assist the novice to the area by indicating a non-exhaustive list of potentially 
ambiguous terms and concepts common to the conduct of professional practice; and (3) 
highlight, as an example, one area of practice where legal direction demands professional 
pragmatism, but also where opportunity arises for psychological research to vitally address a 
major social issue.  
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Most practicing Registered Psychologists work within the Civil domain 
 
Whilst many practising psychologists may reject or resist the notion of offering their 
expertise within Civil litigation matters, it is to be noted that their clients or their legal 
representatives may have access to case notes and documents in the event of becoming party 
to a legal action.  Clients may become involved in civil litigation matters if they have been 
injured or are in dispute with their workplace, to give but two examples.  This access, of 
course, will vary with relevant state and national legislation. However, under many 
circumstances, psychologists may become `witnesses of fact’ and be requested or compelled 
to offer notes or opinion.  This occurs because the psychologist’s notes and reports represent 
a potentially fruitful source of information for lawyers.  However, it is also to be noted that 
the client or their legal agent may then be obliged to then disclose this client material to other 
parties to the action. Indeed, legal advocates and briefed experts to the acting parties (who 
may be other psychologists) may be at times partially reliant on the primacy of the evidence 
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of the treating practitioner.  On such basis, it may be argued that Registered Psychologists in 
practice inherently work within an environment that is of a latent civil litigation form.  
 
Perhaps problematically, the scope of dispersal of information in note and other form is then 
rendered beyond the psychologist’s control. Thus a matter of concern could be of how a 
treating psychologist ought to proceed when faced with requests, demands and directives 
from legal entities representing parties to an action.  In particular, the focal concern for the 
psychologist would be how the demand to disclose material can be reconciled with the 
confidential client relationship. It is also noted that the psychologist’s actions are further 
defined by codes and legislation, with the provisions of the Privacy Act, the Psychologists 
Registration Act, and current Ethical Codifications obvious examples.  
 
On such basis, an effective appreciation of the import of legal actions such as the subpoena of 
notes may be useful.  It is of associated importance that the psychologist be conscious of the 
need to ensure that client consent is suitably obtained in all respects consistent with defining 
legislative and ethical parameters. Given the variable legal frameworks applicable in each 
state, it is not here possible to offer a succinct resolution on how to proceed.  However, it is 
worth noting the general legal and ethical obligations associated with the subpoena process.  
A subpoena is a Court order to produce documents and may also require the psychologist to 
provide oral evidence under oath in a Court of Law. A subpoena may be personally delivered 
and served by the solicitor’s representative or a bailiff or be received by post.   
 
Firstly, it is usually the case that there is no legal obligation to comply with a request from a 
solicitor for copies of a client’s documents unless that request is accompanied by a subpoena. 
However, it is to be noted that information may be provided with the consent of the client and 
given that suitable payment for costs associated with providing the documentation can be 
agreed. Alternatively, the psychologist may consider writing a polite letter providing reasons 
for declining to provide the client’s documentation.  
 
When a solicitor subpoena’s a client’s documentation the psychologist is thereby mandated to 
provide the documentation and the consent of the client to release the information is not 
required.  However, if possible the client could or should be advised that documents have 
been subject to subpoena. Also, the psychologist may object to the release of documents on 
the grounds of relevancy, privacy concerns, on the basis of possible negative impact or 
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because the notes are of overly wide scope given the nature of the information requested. Any 
psychologist’s objection could be made to the lawyer requesting it (informally) or be made to 
the Court (formally).  In the latter case, the Court will review the material that has been 
subject to subpoena and decide on the relevancy, impact and scope of the material requested.  
The Judge has the power to decide if the information requested is not relevant or if only parts 
of the information are relevant to the case. If the Court so decides, then only those parts of the 
documentation that are considered relevant to the case may be released to the solicitor. 
Action can also be taken to protect the privacy of persons mentioned in the documentation if 
deemed necessary. Finally, the psychologist is entitled to the costs associated with the 
subpoena which can include the cost of producing the documents and costs associated with 
giving oral evidence (e.g. travel & lost work time).             
 
Expert Evidence …  
 
Whilst the participation of the treating psychologist in legal action may be subject to request 
or be compelled, the psychologist offering expert evidence is a willing participant.  It is 
important to note that, within the Civil jurisdiction, psychological expertise continues to play 
a substantive role in the contesting of an array of legal actions, such as in personal injuries 
litigation (PI). This particular domain of practice is of recurring public and professional 
interest.  This is because of the considerable media attention given to compensation results, 
also the ongoing claims of economic pressures applied to Insurers.   The latter concerns and 
insurance crisis of the early 2000s’ led to formal review of the Ipp Report of 2002 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) that has in turn inspired significant legislative changes.   
 
Whilst the practice of psychology within the Civil jurisdiction dominantly involves the 
provision of expertise in the resolution of contests pertaining to workers compensation and 
personal injury matters, psychological expertise within the Civil jurisdiction may address a 
much broader range of questions than this. This may include (but is by no means restricted 
to) matters concerned with: discrimination, defamation, professional competence 
(psychologist and others), civil detention, deception, testamentary competence, financial 
competence, competence to manage affairs, competence to make health decisions or enter 
into contracts and various forms of testing of capacity (such as for a Weapon’s Act 
application).  Thus the potential scope in this domain for psychologists to apply expertise, 
also actively conduct research, is broad indeed.  
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It is also to be born in mind that there are some inherent peculiarities involved in working 
professionally in Civil jurisdiction matters, much akin to the Criminal jurisdiction.  One 
prominent example is that, whilst the psychologist’s opinion may be utilised by the decider of 
fact in the deciding of Civil matters such as related to competence and traumatic shock, the 
psychologist must bear in mind that these are in this context legal terms,  thus be suitably 
restrained in not speaking to the ultimate issue directly.  This is similar to the Criminal 
domain, where the psychologist may provide a report but not speak directly to a legal term 
such as insanity or automatism.  Thus the psychologist is restrained from directly addressing 
many concepts in a decisive matter (again, as the psychologist is not usually the decider of 
fact).  This is illustrative of the psychologist acting in the service of the law, whereby the 
psychological is substantially the subservient discipline. The psychologist who steps beyond 
this subservience may encounter legal hazards.  However, opportunities to illuminate 
psychological complexities and educate legal professionals exist and may be considered by 
the diligent practitioner.  
 
… and its hazards 
In most respects, the expert opinion of Psychologists in Civil matters may be seen as a 
commodity to be purchased by the competing legal parties.  The expert opinion may be on 
the form of reports and testimony in proceedings wherein the psychologist’s opinion may be 
of significance in determining the financial outcome of a claim (Warren, 2004).  To curb the 
potential excesses of adversarial bias (the provision of biased opinion), Uniform Civil 
ProcedureRules obligate a primary allegiance to the Court and provides the (rarely taken) 
opportunity for either a single expert to be appointed or for hot-tubbing of experts (who must 
meet and resolve differences of opinion.  It need hardly be stated here that the necessity to 
remain objective in reporting is essential to the profession, practitioner and the legal matter at 
hand. However, the temptations to err are clear and it would be naïve to ignore that the 
experts ethical practices may be seen as possibly in tension with those of the legal 
professionals involved and the potential financial reward of acquiescence.  The accreditation 
of expertise is one possible solution, but as always it remains unclear of who would be expert 
suffice to accredit experts and as noted by Woolf, such a mechanism risks narrowing the 
range of experts available to the Court.    
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Problems are not only of financial or commodity form.  There are also many conceptual 
problems, with the psychologist best prepared for work in the area by an understanding of the 
differing culture and language between the law and psychology.  It is worth considering the 
case that legal professionals struggle at times with psychological concepts and psychological 
expert evidence (Eastman, 2004; Freckelton, Reddy & Selby, 1999, 2001; Gaughwin, 2004).  
 
Conceptual and language problems 
 
Eastman (2004), a psychiatrist, describes the differing conceptual paradigms in legal and 
mental health practice and has used the term ‘translation problems’ to refer to the struggle to 
make sense of each other’s domain.  Eastman has further expanded this metaphor to the 
notion that each professional works in mental-land or legal-land.  However, there would seem 
little equality between these terrains, as the mental-land is legislatively bound to and in 
respects governed by legal land.  Thus the psychologist is obliged to abandon some 
psychological terms to their legal usage.  Many conceptual difficulties for the psychologist 
thereby arise.  It is useful to examine several key examples, with some legal background 
provided: 
 
1. Pure Psychological or Psychiatric Injury: Pure psychological or psychiatric injury 
refers to a recognisable mental injury or harm that is independent of or not caused or 
related to any physical injury. In the seminal decision of Jaensch v Coffey [1984] 54 
HCA 52 the high court recognised that there was a duty of care to avoid causing pure 
mental harm in the absence of physical injuries, particularly where the psychological 
harm was shocked induced (i.e., caused by sudden sensory perception which is so 
distressing that results in a recognisable psychiatric illness. In the Jaensch v Coffey case 
the respondent wife became psychiatrically ill after observing the serious injuries 
sustained by her husband following a motor vehicle accident caused by the negligent 
driving of the appellant. 
 
2. Nervous Shock: This term is not specifically defined in statue or case law but generally 
refers to a recognisable psychiatric/psychological injury suffered as a result of a sudden 
shock from witnessing a loved one injured or killed as a result of the negligence of the 
other party. The Jaensch v Coffey case was interpreted to indicate that a psychiatric injury 
had to be the result of a sudden shock and direct perception of the accident causing the 
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injuries/death or witnessing the immediate aftermath of the accident. In the Jaensch v 
Coffey case the respondent wife did not directly witness her husband being injured in the 
motor vehicle accident but only observed his injuries when she attended the hospital after 
being advised of the accident. Hence, the respondent’s wife witnessed the immediate 
aftermath of the accident and as a consequence developed a recognised 
psychiatric/psychological illness after viewing her husband’s injuries and being subjected 
to and told about her husband’s critical medical situation over a 24 hour period.   
 
 The law in nervous shock cases more appropriately referred to as sudden shock is 
complex and varies across Australian Jurisdictions. The decision in the Jaensch v Coffey 
case was reviewed in the Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35 and Annetts v 
Australian Stations Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 35 and extended a damages claim to include 
recognisable psychiatric injuries that developed over time. The highcourt decided that 
there was a duty of care to avoid exposing persons closely associated (i.e., family, 
affectionate friends & work colleagues) with the injured party to a reasonably 
foreseeable recognisable psychiatric injury. In the Annetts’ case the parents were advised 
that their 16 year old son had disappeared while working alone as a jackaroo on a remote 
cattle station in Western Australian. It was some five months before the body was 
located. As the parents had sought assurances their son would be supervised at all times 
the employees had breached their duty of care by allowing him to work alone and the 
shock of the boys disappearance and subsequent death resulted in a recognisable 
psychiatric injury to the parents. Sudden shock and direct perception were removed as 
preconditions to succeed in recovering damages but could be considered as factors in 
determining the nature of the relationship between parties.   
 
 Due to the Annetts’ decision there was concern about the legal flood gates being opened 
in nervous shock cases and increased insurance premiums. A parliamentary panel chaired 
by Justice Ipp was commissioned to review Tort law and recommended legislating laws 
that would narrow or limit tort damages claims. For instance, among a number of 
recommendations it was recommended that there be no mental harm unless it consisted 
of a recognised psychiatric illness and not one that was just recognisable. The former 
illness needs to be specific such as those identified by the Diagnostic Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) while the latter term was vague. Further, the defendant ought to have 
foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might in the circumstances suffer a recognised 
7 
 
psychiatric illness if reasonable care was not taken. Most Australian jurisdictions adopted 
some of the recommendations (New South Wales adopted all) and developed their own 
coded laws which were not nationally uniform but to some extent limited the decisions in 
the Annetts and Tame cases. Queensland and the Northern Territory did not adopt any of 
the Ipp review recommendations and remain guided by the common tort law. 
 
3. A Person of Normal Fortitude: This phase is not clearly defined in case law but 
generally refers to a person who is not particularly vulnerable to psychiatric illness. In 
other words the term can be taken to mean how a person of normal disposition and 
character would react when hearing of, or witnessing the injury/death of a person they 
are emotionally close too. Duty of care will only arise if it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a person of normal disposition and character would have suffered a psychiatry injury 
(Annetts & Tame Cases). Hence damages for nervous shock was only recoverable if the 
injured party was of normal fortitude unless it was known by the negligent party that the 
injured party was vulnerable to a psychiatric injury. In Jaensch v Coffey the normal 
fortitude test was referred to but its applicability was not decided. Judges in the Annetts’ 
case had varying obiter dicta opinions as to whether normal fortitude should be a 
requirement or only a factor to be taken into account in deciding the case. In the Tame 
casethe normal fortitude test was considered a relevant consideration but not a 
precondition of liability. There has also been legal debate about whether the proof of 
normal fortitude should be decided by the judiciary or expert opinion. This debate has 
not been settled authoritatively. An objective test similar to the reasonable test would 
require a consideration of how a hypothetical person of normal character and disposition 
would react if placed in the same circumstances as the plaintiff.  
 
4.   Consequential Psychological Injury: This is an injury that follows on a physical injury  
such as when a person becomes depressed as a result of being physically incapacitated   
due to an accident. Hence, the psychological injury is not pure as it is not independent of 
the physical injury. 
 
5. The Fit and Proper Person Test: This test is often used to decide if persons are suitable 
for obtaining registration or licence to practice in certain professions, businesses or 
trades or to hold a statutory licence or permit.  For instance, the various Australian 
jurisdictions have enacted legislation with respect to the practice of psychology under the 
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Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act and these jurisdictions require 
psychologists to be fit and proper persons to hold registration in the profession.  The fit 
and proper person test allows the authorising agency to have regard to the applicant’s 
suitability and legal eligibility to undertake the profession, business or activity. Hence, 
consideration can be given to the applicants’ or registrants’ criminal background, honesty 
and knowledge as well as mental and physical fitness to carry out activities in a 
competent, diligent and safe manner. 
 
6. Decision Making Competence or Capacity (e.g., financial, testamentary): All 
Australian jurisdictions have laws in place requiring persons to have the requisite legal 
competence/capacity to sign contracts, make a Will, provide evidence in a court of law, 
stand trial and to make decisions about their medical treatment.  Mental status is an 
important element in deciding the legal competence/capacity of a person as is having 
obtained adults status in some instances. The person is considered to have the legal 
competence/capacity if he or she understands the risks and consequences of their 
decision. For example, in respect to testamentary capacity to make a Will the person 
must have the eligible status (adult & married minors) and the personal competence 
which means that the testator is of sound mind, memory and understanding. The formula 
set out in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5 QB 549, at 565 has been accepted for 
determining testamentary capacity and requires the testator to understand the nature of 
the act and its effects, understand the extent of the property which is being disposed, 
comprehend and appreciate the claims and not be influenced by any disorder of mind in 
disposing of the property.  If there is a question about the competence/capacity of an 
individual this is settled by a Judge and the Judge seeks expert psychiatric or 
neuropsychological opinion for guidance.  
 
Demanding professional pragmatism: The PIRS example   
 
When seeking to answer legal questions, psychologists’ expert evidence is usually required to 
conform to legal parameters, with some degree of subservience to legal demands that may be 
contrary to scientific practice and the primacy of utilising an evidence-based approach.  By 
import, psychologically sound opinion may not prevail in a legal matter - due to overriding 
legal principles rather than any absence of scientific vigour.  Problematically for our 
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profession, dominant legal outcomes (ubiquitously in financial form within the Civil domain) 
may also override therapeutic outcomes (Birgden, 2002; Fox, 1997).   
 
In the former case, a problematic example arises from the usual form of lawyers litigating in 
plaintiff civil action to generate a claim based upon specific heads of damages (matters 
accepted within the legislation as compensable).  In most cases, this is inclusive of an 
assessment of level (or percentage) of impairment arising from injury, also an assessed 
quantum of treatment and anticipation of prognosis given treatment.  The former is difficult 
and the latter arguably speculative.  
 
In order to assess impairment, the psychologist may utilise frameworks such as the American 
Medical Association Guide to Impairment, 5th Edition (Cocchiarella & Andersson, 2001), the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV, Text Revision of the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA, 2000) or be obligated to use the Psychiatric Injury Rating Scale (PIRS). The latter 
instrument (Parmegiani, Lovell, Skinner & Milton, 2001) is mandated within the Civil 
Liabilities Act (Q’ld), 2003 as preferred by the Courts as the mechanism of assessing 
psychological or psychiatric impairment in Queensland.  
 
Problematically, this tool was constructed without and remains without a substantive research 
base (Davies, 2008) and is restricted in use to persons suitably trained (again legislated). 
Whilst the general intention of the tool would seem to have been the introduction of a 
standardised, objective methodology for the assessment of level of impairment in a 
notoriously complex domain, it is questionable if this has been achieved. The tool and its 
system has drawn considerable criticism from the Australian Psychological Society (APS 
2003a; 2003b) and Australian Lawyers Alliance (2001) amongst others for its effect of 
curbing assessments of impairments due to its structure and form.  Perhaps this tool was 
derived from the mood of the time, seeking to wind back the purportedly high compensations 
previously awarded.  However, wind-back took the form of introduced thresholds for the 
award of psychological damages in personal injury matters with a determination of 
psychological injury.  In Victoria, there is a minimum threshold for a psychological and 
denial of award for secondary psychological injuries.  Such limitations do not apply in 
Queensland and indeed variable state legislation has led to a patchwork of provisions and 
conditions within the civil domain.    
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The PIRS system essentially utilises a similar framework to the AMA Guides, 5th Edition 
with six distinct domains to be assessed within 5 classes of severity, as follows:  
1. Self care and personal hygiene; 
2. Social and recreational activities; 
3. Travel; 
4. Social functioning; 
5. Concentration, persistence and pace; and 
6. Adaptation. 
 
However, whilst the PIRS instrument is purportedly a measure of impairment, it more 
directly maps to the allied construct of disability.  Further, the PIRS seeks to determine a 
level of impairment that is based upon a median of level of impairment amongst the 6 
domains.  Clearly, any centralised tendency is inappropriate in minimising the greatest 
impairment that an individual may be confronted by.  
 
Whilst it would seem preferable to a view on impairment via other models, such as the GAF 
(Global Assessment of Functioning, Axis V within the DSM-TR-IV) and an element of axial 
diagnosis by the American Psychiatric Association since 1987.  However, by legislative 
demand, a psychologist (in Queensland at least) is obliged to utilise the PIRS instrument.  
This does not however restrict additional comment on the PIRS and reference to the GAF 
within any given report.  It is appropriate to note that (justifiable) scepticism about a system 
that purports to offer an objective measure in this domain is not restricted to psychologists. 
As noted by White, J. Clark v. Hall and Anor [2006] QSC 274 (26 September 2006) 
As can be seen, the assessment of general damages, rarely a matter of great dispute between 
the parties or of particular complexity at common law in this State, has been made difficult 
by legislative attempt to bring some consistency into this area of the law of personal injury. 
The time involved in traversing the labyrinthine structure of the CLA and Regulation has cast 
a larger burden than hitherto on the medical and legal professions and the courts. It is to be 
hoped that the reduction in general damages awards will have the anticipated effect of 
reducing premiums and the affordability of insurance will be achieved. Otherwise it seems to 
be a rather vexing exercise in over prescription with nothing much to see for it. 
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Conclusion 
 
The intention of this paper has been to illuminate some of the common issues faced by 
psychologists offering expertise within the civil domain.   This has commenced by seeking to 
inform or remind all practising psychologists that their work occurs within legal jurisdiction, 
this is subject to subpoena at the very least.  Further conceptual matters have been reviewed 
for the psychologist who willingly offers expertise to the Court, some of which arise from the 
dominant role of legal domain over the psychological domain – many based upon the 
appropriation of common or psychological terms for legal purposes.  Several key terms have 
been highlighted which have distinctively psychological inference, but are in fact of legal 
significance.   
 
Three common hazards of working to provide expert evidence have been identified, relating 
to the commodification of opinion, associated risk of biased opinion and the legislative 
demand to conform to mechanisms that may be inconsistent with best practice in terms of the 
scientist-practitioner model.  One example highlighted here has been the overshadowing of 
precise professional opinion by the pragmatic need to adhere to a less research-based system 
of assessment of impairment as represented by the PIRS.   
 
On brighter notes to conclude, whilst the psychologist may be at some level of obligation to 
work pragmatically with the PIRS, this does not preclude the psychologist (indeed also 
psychiatrists) seeking to offer an informative view on that system and offer an additional 
mechanism for appreciating impairment.  Also, the form of difficulties here provides a potent 
scope for psychological research within this complex domain of practice.  
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